We study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in the Ramsey economy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning. We extend the existing framework by distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply, which makes agents' decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We detect that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning have oscillatory behaviour. Moreover, we demonstrate that this behaviour can have important implications for the welfare consequences of fiscal reforms.
Motivation
Nowadays, fiscal policy is usually accompanied by legislation and implementation lags. These lags create a non-negligible span of time between the announcement and effective date of a fiscal policy change. This gives individuals in the economy the opportunity to anticipate the tax changes. The economic literature denotes this aspect of fiscal policy either anticipated fiscal policy or fiscal foresight. From our reading, those two terms are equivalents and will be used as such. 1
When agents anticipate, their resulting actions may to some extent depend on the way they form expectations about the future. The standard assumption of expectations in economics is perfect-foresight / rational expectations (RE).
This assumption might be questioned. One prominent deviation of RE that imposes weaker requirements on the agent's information set when making his decisions, is the learning literature (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for the foundations of this approach). The main idea is that agents form expectations about future values of variables they cannot observe by engaging in a kind of statistical inference when making their economic choices.
Although the learning approach has gained significant popularity in some areas of macroeconomics, anticipated fiscal policy has, until recently, been neglected. A pioneering contribution to the study of the consequences of anticipated fiscal policy when agents learn factor prices, has been made by . They demonstrate the adaptive constant gain learning approach in several deterministic economic environments, taking changes in lump-sum taxation 1 Recently Leeper (2009, p.11ff.) has listed empirical evidence for fiscal foresight and reemphasized the relevance of expectations for sound fiscal policy. Furthermore, Leeper et al. (2009) is another good example of empirical evidence of fiscal foresight. Therein they also demonstrate the challenges for econometricians that aim to quantify the impact of fiscal policy actions and at the same time account adequately for fiscal foresight.
1 as an example. The choice of a constant gain therein is motivated by the fact that fiscal policy moves may state structural change. First Evans et al. (2009, p.932ff .) consider permanent, temporary and repeated tax changes in an endowment economy with a balanced-budget policy. The core message of their results is that under learning, anticipated fiscal policy changes have instant effects on key variables as in the perfect foresight case, but the transition paths are remarkably different from the latter. This result, at least with regard to the volatility of key variables' time paths may not come as a surprise. It is well known that constant gain learning causes excess volatility compared to the case of RE (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.49) for an illustration). Thereafter, Evans et al. (2009, p.941ff .) turn attention to the scenario of debt financing of anticipated fiscal policy changes and find that, given agents understand the structure of government financing but have to forecast factor-prices on decentralized markets, the so-called "near Ricardian equivalence" holds under learning. Finally, Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) introduce the adaptive learning approach to the basic Ramsey model. For an anticipated balanced-budget permanent tax change they once more confirm that under learning the time paths of key variables are strikingly different from their perfect foresight counterparts.
In subsequent work, Evans et al. (2010) focus on Ricardian equivalence in the basic Ramsey model with anticipated fiscal policy under learning. Most important, Evans et al. (2010, p.8ff.) formally proof that the assumption of RE is not necessary for the classic Ricardian equivalence result. Furthermore, Evans et al. (2010, p. Building on the contribution of , we aim to generalize their analysis of anticipated fiscal policy under learning into an economy featuring distortionary taxes and elastic labour supply. Thus, our theoretical key contribution is to derive the dynamic paths of key variables for permanent changes in distortionary taxes in a deterministic version of the prominent Ramsey model.
In addition, our second key contribution is to numerically examine fiscal policy reforms, in the presence of several tax instruments.
Note that there are fundamental differences between lump-sum taxation and distortionary taxation: a labour income tax under inelastic labour supply does not affect household margins and therefore causes no distortion, but under elastic labour supply the labour income tax affects the intra-temporal choice between consumption and leisure of the household and may cause an intra-temporal distortion. Next, a capital income tax has the potential to cause up to two types of distortion. First, the capital income tax in any case affects the inter-temporal household Euler equation. In case of elastic labour supply, the capital income tax also affects the intra-temporal choice between consumption and leisure of the household due to its distortion of the consumption choice. Finally, a consumption tax may also cause an inter-temporal distortion by affecting the household Furthermore, the assumption of elastic labour supply implies that endogenous variables such as factor prices as well as employment and consumption are not predetermined as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) or in Evans et al. (2010) , but determined simultaneously in each period.
Next to the analytical derivations, we also calibrate our model and calculate welfare consequences for several policy experiments under perfect foresight as well as under learning. For this purpose, we make use of the welfare measure proposed by Lucas (1990) and also applied by Cooley and Hansen (1992) 
which takes into account the whole transition path between the initial and new steady-states associated with initial and changed tax rates. Thus, putting it differently, we ask, to what extent the excess volatility caused by constant gain learning affects the well-being of households compared to the perfect foresight case. Using such a measure of welfare consequences, may even allow comparison of results for learning dynamics to previous studies such as Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) or Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) . All these studies evaluate and rank various distortionary tax reforms according to their welfare consequences under perfect foresight, but do not consider the case of learning.
Our main results are as follows. When we assume that agents use adaptive learning rules to forecast factor prices, our model predicts oscillatory dynamic responses to anticipated permanent tax changes. The source of the oscillations are expectational errors. In addition, policy experiments indicate that these volatile responses may have a major impact on the welfare consequences of tax reforms. In particular we consider experiments that improve welfare but do so to a much lower extent under learning compared to perfect foresight.
Note that our approach links the learning literature to that part of the public finance literature that is concerned with the welfare consequences of different types of taxation. See Chamley (1981) for an example of a comparative statics analysis or Judd (1987) for differences in unanticipated and anticipated changes in factor taxes. In addition, there have been studies in stochastic set-ups, like Cooley and Hansen (1992) . With regard to the implementation of anticipated optimal fiscal policy an example is Domeij and Klein (2005) or its extension for public goods and capital by Trabandt (2007) . Moreover, Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) have recently conducted research on welfare consequences of fiscal policy experiments in the spirit of Cooley and Hansen (1992) in a heterogeneous agents model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the economic model, derive optimality conditions and detail our approach of learning. Section 3 compares the dynamics with and without elastic labour supply for the case of lump-sum tax changes. This section also provides sensitivity analysis for some structural parameters. In Section 4 we consider changes in distortionary taxation and present a numerical welfare analysis of selected policy experiments.
Section 5 concludes and points out directions for further research.
The Model
Our economy is a version of the Ramsey economy outlined in detail in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, p.305ff.) . The capital stock k t evolves according to the 5 economy-wide resource constraint
where F (k t , n t ) is the economy's production function (equalling output) showing that the firm sector uses capital k t and labour n t as inputs to produce the single good of the economy (see Section 2.2 for the details). Output can either be consumed by households (c t ) or the government (g t ) or added to the capital stock. Capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate δ.
Households
With regard to the household sector, we assume a continuum of households, where we normalize the size of the economy to unity and each household faces the problem max ct,nt
where all variables are in per capita terms. Thus, the variable k t+1 denotes the stock of capital in period t + 1 and b t+1 is the level of government debt holdings chosen in period t. Furthermore, r t is the rental rate of capital and R t is the gross real interest rate in period t. The level of consumption chosen in period t is indicated by c t . Next, τ • t denotes a distortionary tax either on consumption, 6 labour income or capital income 3 . The real wage in period t is given by w t and l t =L − n t denotes leisure. In consequence, n t is labour supply of the household.
τ t is a per capita lump-sum tax and π t = 0 is the profit under perfect competition among firms. Furthermore, the parameter η ≥ 0 measures the elasticity of labour supply and the parameter β is the common discount rate. Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.61) . In Section 2.4 below we outline our concept of learning. An important aspect of this concept is that forecasts of single variables are independent of each other. In consequence, we can assume that for any two variables X and Y it is true that
holds. Now, we detail the household's decisions. Each household solves the La-
From (4) and (6) we get the household Euler condition
(5) and (6) yield the no-arbitrage condition for capital and bonds
and from (4) and (7) we get the consumption leisure trade-off
Firms
In our economy, there is a unit continuum of firms who compete perfectly.
Each firm in each period t rents capital at given price r t and labour at given price w t and produces the numeraire good with constant returns to scale production 8 function
where α ∈ (0, 1). The optimal firm behaviour requires that
as well as
i.e. each production factor earns its marginal product. Finally, we have the per capita national income identity
which means zero profits, as one can expect from perfect competition.
Government
The government finances its expenses on goods and debt repayment by tax revenues and the issuance of new bonds in each period t
For the remainder, we will assume that the government operates a balancedbudget rule in each period t, thus tax revenues will fully cover expenses such that 9 bonds are in zero net supply as a direct consequence. Thus the government sets g t , τ c t , τ l t , τ k t and τ t constrained by
in each period t.
Learning
Now, we aim to detail our concept of learning that was elaborated in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) . For completeness we restate the crucial assumptions on learning. Under learning, households are supposed to know the entire history of endogenous variables. They observe the current period value of exogenous variables and they know the state variables. Furthermore, they know the structure of the economy with regard to the fiscal policy sector. Agents understand the implications of the announced policy change for the government budget constraint.
They are also convinced that the intertemporal government budget constraint will always hold (see Evans et al. (2009, p.944) ). It is decentralized markets for labour and capital, where agents are not in possession of perfect foresight. Actual factor prices are not observable. Thus, agents forecast factor prices such as interest rates and wages r e t+j (t), w e t+j (t), j ≥ 1, by making use of constant-gain steady-state adaptive learning rules 5 r e t+j (t) = r e (t) and w e t+j (t) = w e (t),
where 
Second, the timing of the learning rule, i.e. that agents' update in period t uses data up to period t − 1, is chosen in order to avoid simultaneity between r e (t) and r t as well as w e (t) and w t (see for example Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.51) ).
Think of simultaneity in this context as a situation in which agents' expectations affect current values of aggregate endogenous variables and vice versa, which may potentially introduce some strategic behaviour. Such a learning rule yields a sequence of so-called temporary equilibria, which consist of sequences of (planned) time paths for all endogenous variables. These sequences satisfy the learning rule above, the expectation history, household and firm optimality conditions, the government budget constraint and the economy-wide resource constraint given the exogenous variables as well as the current stock of capital in each period. These plans are revisited and potentially altered in each period after expectations have been updated.
Base Case: Lump-Sum Tax
Before pursuing our core issue, i.e. the case of distortionary taxation, we would like to illustrate the applied methodology for the case of lump-sum taxation for two reasons: first, we want to illustrate the consequences of the introduction of elastic labour supply compared to the case of inelastic labour supply as assumed in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) and its effect on the dynamic paths of the key variables such as consumption and capital, given their calibration (see Table 1 below); second, below in Subsection 3.2, we aim to present a sensitivity analysis for the very basic version of the model under examination.
Let us now derive the dynamic paths under learning for an anticipated lumpsum tax change. Consequently we assume all other types of taxation away, i.e. τ c t = τ l t = τ k t = 0. The Euler equation (8) is standard
and forward substitution of this yields
. One can think of this term as "expectations of the interest rate factor D t,t+j at time t" (see Evans et al. (2009, p.933) ). Next, we notice that the consumption leisure trade-off in this case is
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital 8
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
which by the virtue of (18) and (19) yields
Equations (12) and (13) hold for firms. Finally, government faces the constraint
in each period t and the economy-wide resource constraint is given by (1).
We now need to think about the policy experiment we will study. We are looking at a scenario of a credible permanent change in taxes announced at the 8 Note that agents plan to satisfy this condition.
13 outset of period t = 1 and effective from period t = T p onwards. In particular a tax change from τ 0 to τ 1 at some point in time T p . The dynamics under perfect foresight are standard. 9 Under learning we can directly follow Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) . The crucial step is to calculate the infinite sums on the right-hand side of (21), i.e. SW 1 and ST 1 . Directly following the appendix in Evans et al. (2009, p. 951ff.) we calculate
With regard to ST 1 , we have 10
for 1 ≤ t < T p and
for t ≥ T p . From (21) follows that we have
for t ≥ T p . Given a calibration, we can then compute the dynamics of consumption and other endogenous variables.
Inelastic Labour Supply vs. Elastic Labour Supply
We believe that it is of importance to use a model that features elastic labour supply in order to calculate welfare implications of fiscal policy reforms adequately. Completely inelastic labour supply is a quite unrealistic assumption itself and at least some moderately elastic labour supply should be considered.
Moreover, inelastic labour supply implies that agents' choices of current period endogenous variables are in fact predetermined as is pointed out in Evans et al. (2009, p.944) . In order to illustrate differences in the dynamics of endogenous variables based on the assumption of inelastic and elastic labour supply, we return to the simulation exercise of Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) . Note that τ c t = τ l t = τ k t = δ = 0 and η = 0 imply that n t =L (i.e. inelastic labour supply) for all t (see equation (19)). Therefore, we are exactly in the same scenario as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) . Although we do not fully agree with the calibration of , we will stick to their calibration in this subsection to keep our results comparable. We will indicate, when we deviate from their calibration later on. The basic reason for this disagreement is the combination of parameters β = 0.95 and T p = 20. These parameter choices imply that a government, which in reality is usually in charge of a legislation period of four to six years, may announce a tax policy change that will be effective in 20 years' time. From our perception of political execution and our confidence in fiscal policy makers' 15 ability to commit, this appears to be unrealistic in most cases.
For the moment, we calibrate the model according to Table 1 below.
Insert Table 1 here.
The policy experiment considered in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff .) is a permanent increase in government purchases from g 0 = τ 0 = 0.9 to g 1 = τ 1 = 1.1 that is announced credibly in period t = 1 and will be effective from period T p = 20 onwards. It is assumed that the economy is in steady-state in period In our opinion, the reason for the significant differences in the dynamics under learning between elastic and inelastic labour supply can be explained by considering the initial responses of variables to the anticipated policy change and its consequences for the expectations formation process of agents in turn.
In Figure 1 the decline of current wealth due to an anticipated higher lumpsum tax rate from date T p onwards causes households to save more instantly which results in an initial drop in consumption, which can be seen from (26).
Given elastic labour supply, this drop in consumption leads to a rise of labour supply via (10). As the stock of capital is predetermined and cannot respond instantly, the increase of labour supply clearly implies a rise in the rental rate of capital and a fall in the real wage via (12)-(13). The capital stock in the subsequent period will be larger due to (1).
Note that under learning the expectations about factor prices as specified in (16)- (17) do not initially respond. This causes a difference between the factor price and its expectation, i.e. an expectational error. Exactly this error triggers the oscillating learning process that starts in the subsequent period.
Next, consider the algebra of the learning rule (16) (17) is positive. Thus, the expected value of the rental rate of capital increases after the update in the subsequent period. This causes households to save even more and to consume even less compared to the previous period. Thus, next periods capital stock will be larger and the actual rental-rate of capital will be lower than in the current period.
In analogy, households supply labour and given the fall of the real wage in the initial period, the expectational error in the related learning rule (16)- (17) is negative. Thus, the expected value of the real wage decreases after the update in the subsequent period. The lower expected real wage causes households to supply even more labour compared to the previous period.
Notice that these movements in actual variables continue until the signs of the expectational errors change. Then the movements of actual variables proceed in the opposite directions. Furthermore, the evolution of these variables in turn explains the evolution of all remaining variables such as output.
In addition, inspection of (10) and (26) Figure 1 , we conclude that it is not the different assumption about labour supply per se that causes the differences in the dynamics, but the fact that expectational errors in the two cases are different.
Sensitivity Analysis
Compared to the previous literature on welfare evaluation of tax reforms, our learning approach introduces two additional structural parameters. One is γ, the gain parameter and a second one is T p , the period, in which the pre-announced tax change becomes effective. Therefore, we are interested in how these two parameters affect the dynamic properties of the model.
Sensitivity Analysis for the Gain Parameter
No matter what calibration, one usually has to choose a gain parameter γ in the adaptive learning literature. In this subsection we would therefore like 20 to illustrate the consequences of different choices of the gain parameter. The sole empirical estimate we are aware of is provided by Milani (2007 Milani ( , p.2074 for quarterly frequency and is γ = 0.0183. This number indicates that agents use approximately 1/γ ≈ 55 quarters of data. But a reason to be cautious to use the estimate of Milani (2007 Milani ( , p.2074 is that it is based on a data set containing output, inflation and the nominal interest rate, whereas in our setting agents forecast the rental rate of capital and the real wage. Next, Milani (2007 Milani ( , p.2074 mentions that for constant gain learning a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.03] is commonly used. Evans and Honkapohja (2009, p.154 In Figure 2 (a) we observe that the smaller the gain γ, the smaller the increase in consumption until the period of the tax change T p (after the initial drop). Furthermore, as we recognize from Figure 2(b) , the smaller the gain γ, the larger the increase in capital accumulation until the period of the tax change T p . However, in both Figure 2(a) Inspection of the learning rule (16)-(17) explains this fact. In the alternative representation the term (1 − γ) i one can observe that the smaller the gain, the stronger the discounting of past data. Thus, the more unimportant is past data for agents expectation formation. One can also think of this as agents having more confidence in their initial expectations. But, if these expectations are wrong, and they have to be once a tax change occurs, then they have bigger errors over time and need longer to learn the new steady-state.
Summing up, we find that for the parameter range considered in this sensitivity analysis, the choice of the gain parameter γ is not crucial for the shape of the dynamic response.
Sensitivity Analysis for the Implementation Date
Another issue that may be of interest is the implementation date T p . As mentioned above a tax policy change that is going to be effective in 20 years time appears to be unrealistic from our point of view. Therefore, we examine sensi- In Figure 3 (a) we observe that the shorter the distance between the announcement date and implementation date of the tax change, the higher the initial drop in consumption and the lower the increase in consumption until the implementation date thereafter. Focusing on capital, in Figure 3 (b) we observe that with decreasing distance between the announcement date and implementation date of the tax change, the level that capital reaches until the implementation date, is also lower. Finally, for implementation in three years time, i.e. T p = 3, learning dynamics are not significantly different from T p ∈ {10, 20}, but lower in scale.
Overall, we observe that the shorter the distance between announcement date and implementation date of the tax change, the earlier the learning dynamics approach the steady-state, but, at least for the parameter range considered herein, the nature of dynamics is not seriously affected.
Thus, we learn that in the subsequent numerical analysis, next to the elasticity of labour supply η (and the commonly known candidate parameters β and δ), the choice of the gain parameter γ as well as the implementation date T p may also be crucial in achieving convergence on the one hand and determining the magnitude of volatility of the dynamics on the other hand. But these choices may not affect the general nature of the dynamics. Furthermore, our experience with β and δ suggests that they strongly affect the scale of results, next to their impact on convergence.
In order to summarize, there are three important insights from the analysis above. First, there are at least qualitative differences between the case of inelastic labour supply (η = 0) and elastic labour supply (η > 0). Therefore, if one regards the latter assumption as more realistic, a model that allows for elastic labour supply is a more appropriate framework to study anticipated fiscal policy under learning. Second, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the choice of the gain parameter γ and the implementation date T p does not affect the nature of transition paths so we consider ourselves free to choose any of the values considered in the sensitivity analysis. 13 Finally and most notably, we observed at least a qualitative difference in the dynamics under learning compared to the dynamics under perfect foresight. The former appear to be much more volatile than the latter. This stylized fact, from our point of view, justifies the quantification and comparison of welfare cost of anticipated fiscal policy reforms under learning and under perfect foresight. In order to be able to mimic, at least to some extent, a realistic fiscal policy reform, we will introduce distortionary taxes. Before we look at complex fiscal policy reforms, we qualitatively inspect isolated changes in distortionary taxes and the resulting dynamics for each type of tax. Thereafter, we analyze more sophisticated fiscal policy reforms with regard to their welfare costs in a realistic calibration.
The Case of Distortionary Taxation
After the base case of lump-sum taxation, we now study the case of distortionary taxes. In the remainder, we will assume elastic labour supply. We first derive the dynamic paths of the economy in presence of multiple types of taxes. 14 Thereafter, we evaluate some specific tax reforms with regard to welfare, given our suggested calibration.
Let us now assume that τ c t , τ l t , τ k t ∈ [0, 1] and τ t = 0 for all t. The Euler equation (8) (1 + τ c t ) (1 + τ c,e t+1 (t))
[(1 − δ) + (1 − τ k,e t+1 (t))r e t+1 (t)]
and forward substitution of this expression yields c p t+j (t) = β j D k,e t,t+j (t)
where we define D k,e t,t+j (t) ≡ Π j i=1 [(1−δ)+(1−τ k,e t+i (t))r e t+i (t)]. Furthermore, notice that the consumption leisure trade-off is now given by (10). Given the adequate transversality condition for capital
which by the virtue of (28) as well as (10) yields (
For firms nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3. Finally government now faces the constraint (15) in each period t. The economy-wide resource constraint is again given by (1). 
Finally, ST 3 on the right-hand side of (30) is
Given (16) and (17), for 1 ≤ t < T p we calculate
and for t ≥ T p we calculate
Given (30) we can then compute the dynamics responses for consumption and the other endogenous variables as before. Now, we will conduct several policy experiments numerically and compute welfare measures following the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) . 17 Intuitively speaking, we compute the increase in consumption that an individual would require to be as well off as under the equilibrium allocation without taxes. We express that number in percentage of output. First, we will do so for our initial choice of tax levels (see line 1 in Table 3 below). Thereafter, we carry out policy reforms, where we change taxes 17 We detail the computation in Appendix B.
28 in a certain way and each time recalculate welfare measure both for learning and perfect foresight. As a result we can then compare the welfare implications for a tax change under perfect foresight against the case under learning. Note that we use the measure of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) for the transition paths.
We do so because their measure for static comparison would lead to the same number for perfect foresight and learning, as in both cases the initial and new steady-states are identical.
An additional parameter needs to be chosen. That is the evaluation horizon T . Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) Table 3 below, our calibration of the model is according to Table 2 below.
Insert Table 2 here.
We choose the initial tax rates to be τ 0 = 0.0000, τ l 0 = 0.2300, τ k 0 = 0.5000 and τ c 0 = 0.0500. These non-zero tax rates lead to distortions. The first row in Table   3 reveals the welfare loss between the steady-state of the economy without taxes and the steady-state of the economy with our initially chosen tax rates amounts to 73.72%. This number tells us the change in consumption (in percentage of output) which is required so that households in the economy with initial tax levels are as well off as in the case with zero taxes is 73.72%. Be aware that Table   3 also indicates that without taxes our calibration yields a first best steady-state employment of n F B = 0.4024, which implies 9.66 hours. With the initial taxes in place, the steady-state employment is n 0 = 0.4326, which implies 10.38 hours.
Now we assume a credible pre-announced permanent tax reform that favours capital accumulation, i.e. we lower the capital income tax to a level of τ k 1 = 0.2500. As suggested by Judd (1987) , Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen (1992) this is expected to reduce the welfare costs of distortionary taxation. In each experiment reported lines 2 to 4 in Table 3 below, one of the other tax instruments, τ • , τ l • or τ c • will be raised to a level that ensures that the periodic tax revenue in the new steady-state is the same as in the initial steady-state. 18
The second row of Table 3 We can also observe that the new steady-state employment n 1 is lower than the initial steady-state employment n 0 .
The pattern just described is also true, if we compensate the cut in τ k • by an increase in τ c • or τ • as the third and fourth row in Table 3 indicate. It is noteworthy 18 Note, that as long as the dynamics under learning and perfect foresight differ, one is not able to equalize present values of tax revenues under learning and perfect foresight to the present value of tax revenues in the initial steady-state by manipulating tax rates in the same way. This approach was used in the analysis of Cooley and Hansen (1992) for perfect foresight only, but is not feasible in our case. In addition, we believe that keeping present values constant is not the kind of fiscal policy change that governments conduct in reality. Moreover, we believe that our comparison of welfare costs under learning to welfare costs under perfect foresight is valid even without equalizing present values of the tax revenue. 19 We would like to emphasize that we set the rate of depreciation to δ = 0 in order to achieve convergence for the dynamics under learning. That might be the reason, why the scale of W both under learning and perfect foresight is approximately twice the scale as the results in Cooley and Hansen (1992) . that using the the lump-sum tax to compensate for the cut in the capital income tax yields the largest welfare improvement and keeps steady-state employment at the highest level independent of the assumption about expectations.
Thus, experiments 2 to 4 indicate that the resulting welfare improvements of an anticipated tax reform might be much smaller in magnitude under learning compared to its improvements under perfect foresight.
Insert Table 3 here.
Conclusion
We demonstrate that the responses to anticipated permanent tax changes when agents learn are remarkably different compared to their counterparts under perfect foresight. The dynamics under learning appear to oscillate around the steady-state to which they converge slowly. Thus, there is more volatility under learning.
We argue that the observed oscillations are related to expectational errors.
The expectational errors are caused by the anticipated permanent tax change.
The persistence of the expectational error in the learning rule of the agents is the fundamental reason for the oscillations.
Moreover, sensitivity analyses show that a smaller gain parameter leads to higher volatility in our framework. This result is at odds with conventional wisdom about the link between the gain parameter and the dynamic responses in the learning literature.
In the subsequent analysis we derive the dynamics in the presence of multiple tax instruments. Policy experiments in this set-up indicate that the magnitude of welfare improvements due to the tax reform considered herein appears to be substantially lower under the assumption of learning compared to the case of perfect foresight. The reason may be the oscillatory behaviour of the dynamics under learning.
Form our point of view these results raise two major issues. First, oscillatory dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are rarely found in actual economic data. This fact questions the suitability of the model herein for policy analysis.
Second, given that this model would be suitable for policy analysis, our results indicate that permanent tax changes may lead to lower welfare improvements under learning compared to perfect foresight.
We believe that future research in this area needs to come up with convincing empirical evidence on whether or how agents learn about fiscal policy. In addition, we also need to clarify from actual economic data, how the dynamic responses to anticipated permanent tax changes look like. Are they smooth or oscillatory?
With regard to theoretical considerations, it would also be desirable to derive a version of the model that allows for changing different tax rates at different points in time and therefore allows for public debt accumulation. But this task is beyond the focus of this paper and we aim to pursue that idea in subsequent research.
Furthermore, we think that perfect foresight and the implied once and for all choices of agents on the one hand and learning which implies periodic revision of current and future choices of agents on the other hand are extreme cases. One could also imagine agents that use adaptive learning, but infrequently and with differing interval length update their expectations and revise their current and future choices. Alternatively, agents randomly receive a signal to update their expectations.
In addition, more sophisticated computational methods may allow to calibrate the rate of depreciation different from zero or more realistic values of the elasticity of labour supply and still ensure convergence for the dynamics under learning on the other side. This could facilitate numerical results that are directly comparable to the existing literature in public finance.
A. Model Derivations

A.1. Timing
We believe that the understanding of the timing is crucial to follow the derivations. For time periods indexed by t, discounting periods indexed by j, and an implementation date T p announced in t = 1 and T ≡ T p − t denoting the number of periods until T p we got the following picture: t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ... j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... 
